Tell Me what you think

This is an experiment…

1. Review the theoretical underpinnings of persuasive messages in relation to specific audiences, taking into account at least three of the following constructs: agenda setting, diffusion of innovation, central and peripheral processing, cognitive dissonance, source credibility, reasoned action, two-step flow, selectivity, expectancy-value and fear appeals.  As a writer/producer, which basic model would you use in developing political advertising for your candidate targeted at the general public.  Justify your selection.

 

2. The media landscape has certainly changed in the last few years. A dramatic example of this is the way non-fiction films are distributed.  Ten years ago there were only a few places where independent producers might sell their documentaries. Today there are many more outlets.  What are these new opportunities? Describe at least three case studies of non-fiction films that have profited from these new avenues of distribution.

 

3. Programming is what attracts audiences to television but advertising is the primary means of revenue generation for most networks and stations.  In a situation when 1) specific broadcast programming is attacked for containing too much “skin and sin” by traditional family values groups, 2) advertisers are inundated with thousands of email, letters and telephone calls to stop buying commercial time by concerned family group followers and 3) some advertisers withdraw, is this a triumph for the television audience, a chilling effect on broadcast TV creativity, or a step towards censorship and bland programming?   Assume each of these perspectives and cite evidence from previous program histories to explicate how these electronic media issues evolved, were resolved and continue to coexist.

 

4. In November 2007, the Writers Guild of America went on strike after its members and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers failed to negotiate a deal.  What are (were) the issues at stake in this conflict?  Trace the history of this conflict between these two groups and the consequent effects on television viewing audiences and new programming development.  How will this strike inform the future of new media and old media, and how will it affect you as someone who will be working in the industry as a) a writer, and b) a studio or network executive?

 

5.  In the coming years Cable TV will face very real competition from the telephone companies for customers. Give the competitive advantages of each industry and the efforts both have made in Congress and at the FCC to deal with perceived inequities in the competitive landscape.

 

6. The utilization of new and different media platforms — web streaming, mobiphones and the like — to deliver television programming has given rise to “anytime, anywhere, media measurement.” This system purports to track in-home and out-of-home viewing, Internet and phone TV usage, as well as traditional television viewing.  In addition, commercial ratings or audience viewership levels during the commercial breaks are now available to advertisers.

A)    What improvements does this system of audience measurement represent over the traditional ratings system?  

B)    How would producers, programmers and advertisers benefit from the new audience measurements?

C)    What are some of the concerns critics have raised and how can these be addressed?

 

7.  “American TV is dangerous to our children’s health.”   Scientific studies have shown that children who spend the most time with television are also those who are more likely to be overweight.  Children who watch television violence are more likely to behave in harmful ways towards others and become less empathetic.  You are testifying on behalf of television writers and producers before a congressional subcommittee intent on refining policy to protect the health of our nation’s children.  How would you address these findings in the face of existing legislation and offer solutions to parents, assurances to policy makers as well as a sound bite for the next news cycle?

 


8.  Screenwriter William Goldman, a two-time Academy Award winner, has long preached that “screenplays are structure.” What is he talking about? 

A) If he’s referring to a particular story-telling model, describe that in detail.

B) If there are multiple models, what are the most influential ones and how do they differ?

C) And how has story structure evolved through the centuries?

Use examples from the 2008 Oscar nominees to illustrate your points.

 

9.  Think about this: Today you can watch movies on your video iPod.  You can also watch TV on your cell phone.  Through global marketing you can catch the release of the latest big studio film in Shanghai, China the same day as in Syracuse, New York (probably a few days earlier).  The social media network, Facebook on which you used to post pictures for your friends is now valued at $15 billion. 

 

During your year at Newhouse, the media environment will continue to change dramatically. These changes may come from some new technology or an economic or policy shift. For example, if you’re reading the papers and the trades, you know that ABC News and Facebook have teamed up to develop a new tool to facilitate political debate coverage and interactivity on the social networking site;  the major TV networks continue to offer streaming video of their programs, and advertisers are using “skins,” “overlays” or “bugs” to promote their products and services online.

 

If you’re bright, flexible and entrepreneurial, you’ll find ways to make your career in any number of these future transformations. Even better, you should be smart enough to anticipate and take advantage of such changes before they (or you) are history. This is your chance to begin the birth of a future transformation that will bear your name.

 

Write a proposal for your new concept. What is it? What makes it unique? How does it take advantage of existing or new technologies, economies and/or policies? Specify what research you will do to determine if there is an audience and market. What legal and regulatory issues will you have to be aware of? Who are the people or institutions you need to convince this is the greatest thing since the iPod? Who are the people or institutions you don’t want to know about your idea until it’s a reality and why? Describe how this concept will ripple through the media environment or how it might have an impact on only a specialized niche.

 

An important part of your answer will be a personal inventory assessment: what talents, skills, knowledge, etc. that you possess make it possible for you to actuate this concept? Be realistic; if you’re not Steve Wozniak, recognize that and plan to hire him as a consultant. But if your idea is “television for housebound cats”, be-up front about your special understanding of the feline spirit.

 

10. In the book “The World is Flat” by Thomas Friedman, referring to a program called “Higglytown Heroes” being produced for the Disney Channel by Wild Brain, an animation studio in San Francisco, Wild Brain CEO Scott Hyten remarked about how the all-American show was being produced by an all-world supply chain —  The recording session is located near the artist, usually in New York or L.A., the design and direction is done in San Francisco, the writers network in from their homes (Florida, London, New York, Chicago, L.A., and San Francisco), and the animation of the characters is done in Bangalore 

(India).  These interactive recording/writing/animation sessions allow us to record an artist for an entire show in less than half a day, including unlimited takes and rewrites.

            Given the increasing trend in production toward on-line collaboration using work flow software, discuss the impact of such a trend on established television production methods and financing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The answers will come after a time.

-Alex

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Lies Through the Ether: American, German, and British Propaganda during World War Two

Radio was a significant, though largely unrecognized weapon used in World War two by both Axis and Allied nations.  The medium was used effectively when targeting countries or areas that already had large internal divisions.  It was also used significantly to unify the United States and promote the war effort.

 It is important to define the different types of propaganda used during the war and who employed them.  Some people could see a broadcast as propaganda while another might consider it patriotism. The defining difference in the context of World War II is between overt broadcasts where the agenda is promoting the war effort and broadcasts that are deceptive about the source and the agenda is to provide the enemy with subversive information or influence. Black propaganda employs accurate information in order to appear credible and employs false information to undermine moral or incite rebellion within the enemy population.  It generally uses appeals to fear and stereotyping to create divisions and often claims to be broadcasting from within the county of the target audience.  White propaganda generally consists of accurate news and information that favors political agendas by playing down or omitting negative information and exaggerating positive information.  Grey Propaganda does not identify the source of the broadcast and is a more subtle version of black propaganda.[1]

Great Britain and Germany both had large broadcast campaigns to relay inaccurate information about victories, defeats, conditions as well as often being deceptive about the identity of the broadcast stations themselves.  The United States also operated clandestine stations after we entered the war but it was most effectively used in America as a way to sell the war to the American public. The emphasis was on unifying the nation to win a war against our way of life and the dangers of losing the war was very real.

 The bulk of the subversive radio broadcasts was in the European theater and was more effective in directly influencing those on the battlefield or in contested areas.  In addition, much of the American propaganda was either destroyed or banned following the war because the government did not want to be accused of misleading the public or providing inaccurate information.  The US also did not operate any black propaganda until we entered the war while these kinds of broadcasts had been going on in Europe for many years.  

An important issue at the time for both sides was the existence of a “Fifth Column” within allied countries.  The “Fifth Column” is a term used to describe a dissenting organization operating to undermine or overthrow the presiding government.  Axis powers preyed upon the fear of a fifth Column, its size and power, while the allies tried to discredit these efforts.  There were few cases of the reverse happening because of the extreme oppressive nature of the axis regimes.  This is to say that the Gestapo was extremely effective at finding and killing any dissenters.  For the most part, Allied broadcasts did not seek to achieve any military objective but instead was focused on decreasing moral among the enemy.

The United States rally-cap Radio.

             Prior to the United States entrance into the war the information given to American broadcasters from Britain was intended to sway the US neutrality.  It is important to note the British broadcasts to the United States and the influence they had.  Collaboration with American journalists like Edward R. Murrow, the BBC experimented with many forms of news broadcasts before finding one that kept the American audiences listening.  This became easier during and after the battle of Britain because the BBC got rid of most restrictions and started to broadcast directly to the American people instead of broadcasting to a general public that the Americans might be a part of.[2]  American broadcasters reporting on the war were in general vehemently anti-Nazi and began identifying with our soon to be allies through emotional appeals, “the defense of Britain will be something of which men will speak with awe and admiration so long as the English language survives” (Murrow)[3].  Broadcast air raids and battles from London with running commentary by American journalists soon followed and these journalists learned the selective broadcast technique that would later prove instrumental on the home front.  The experiences of these journalists is significant in that they lived in London for the most part and were injured and exposed to attack like any other Londoner.  These events often gave an emotional and sometimes fearful tone to the radio personalities listened to by American audiences. After we entered the war, the focus of wartime broadcast shifted to patriotic appeals.

 The collaboration of the four networks after America’s entrance to the war to relay information, accurate or not, was instrumental in influencing the general opinion about the war and its progress.  This was done through films, TV and most significantly radio because at that time 80% of American households had a radio. For example, the program “This is War” aired during primetime on Saturday night reached an estimated 20 million people each week between February and May 1942[4]  One of the first and most effective programs was a 13 show series called “This is War, which turned dry statistics into moving tales of world war and national mobilization…depicted the war as a truly global event, one that required all Americans to support their nation’s crusade against fascist tyranny”[5]    The Office of War Information set voluntary wartime guidelines called the Network Allocation Plan which was tacitly approved by network producers. These guidelines called for providing truthful information and censoring information that would help the enemy.  Advertising was also linked to the war effort with government tax breaks for informational ads. Officially there were never any conscious lies told to producers or broadcast to the public but as radio was largely an entertainment medium, accounts of battle were often severely fictionalized.  The broadcasters found an effective mix of fact and fiction to both show the dangers of losing and also to promote the idea that we were winning.  The other staples of these kinds of broadcasts were a promotion of sympathy for the allied powers and moral appeals. Accounts of brutality by the axis powers against the allies were often very graphic and served to show the evil nature of the enemy and the plight of our allies.[6]

 Though these accounts were certainly not even handed with atrocities no doubt occurring on both sides, it would not have taken a lot of rhetoric to show moral superiority over the Nazis.  One important reason for this was the fact that America’s own significant racial divisions were never mentioned and neither were moral or ethical excesses in countries like Russia and China.   In contrast to how people like the Chinese were depicted in media prior to the war, the pigtailed laundrymen became noble warriors.[7] Underlying these dramatized messages appealing to emotion and patriotism was always encouragement of war production through war bonds etc.  The creator or “This is war” Norman Corwin states in the first episode “the fight is on, and you are in it, whether you handle a bayonet or a monkey wrench” (Corwin, February 14, 1942)[8]  this subjective interpretation of news and constant flag waving significantly aided the United States in the war effort at home.  The United States would also contribute important Radio technology, including a giant transmitter from RCA to help with the clandestine operations already going on in Europe.   

                                    Techniques of Black Broadcasts

Many different techniques were used by all sides to reach their respective subversive aims.  The most common method was to pose as a group that is very close in ideology to the target audience most of the time and sneaks in almost subliminal appeals to fear and authority.  They commonly claimed to be a part of the minority political party.  These types of broadcasts were intended to sway political beliefs but were often recognized as being supported by the enemy.  Other broadcasts tried to imitate or even impersonate the official government broadcasts.  A skilled British broadcaster might make a speech purporting to be Hitler or the Germans would use a technique called snuggling to insert their own information over a BBC broadcast by broadcasting at an adjacent frequency but with more power.  During battles, verifiable military information was supplied to establish credibility and was supplemented by false information to ultimately confuse the enemy.

                                                Nazi Radio

The propaganda employed by Britain and the US was a reaction to the Nazi tactics and was an imitation of what the Germans did to influence their own people and possible allies outside Germany.  Propaganda in general was highly regarded by Adolf Hitler and he even devoted portions of Mein Kamf to extolling its virtues.  As his preferences and ideals had to be the same as everyone else’s, propaganda was a large and important part of the Nazi war machine.  The use of Radio in particular was successful in reaching and influencing Germans and non Germans alike.  Broadcasts were given within Germany and occupied countries along with flyers, newspapers and film, but to more effectively impair their enemies, the Nazis put out a lot of radio broadcasts directed at dissenting groups.

  The propaganda minister of the Nazi Regime, Joseph Goebbels, also attached great significance to radio, calling it the most influential invention since the printing press.  Goebbels also states, in a radio address, that “It would not have been possible for us to take power or to use it in the ways we have without the radio and the airplane. It is no exaggeration to say that the German revolution, at least in the form it took, would have been impossible without the airplane and the radio.”[9]

 The Nazi Government began by fostering the manufacture of more than 10 million receivers for issue to the general public.  They then nationalized all broadcast stations and set programs to focus on German unity and anti-Semitism.  Shortly after this Broadcast nationalization in 1933, the propaganda ministry set up black and grey station to undermine the moral of the enemy and encourage already present divisions.  This technique was used most notably in France and Great Britain, exploiting communist and racial divisions as well as nationalistic ones.  One of the first uses of Black propaganda by the Nazis was during the Spanish civil war to create confusion in Spain to Franco’s advantage.  It also played a part in the annexation of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938.[10]  The RRG (German Broadcasting Company) set up many stations with several target audiences.  These audiences or broadcast zones were set up according to the agenda at the time. For example, broadcasts to France were numerous and frequent immediately prior to the invasion.  Broadcasts were targeted at France, Great Britain, British Colonies, The Balkans, the Soviet Union (post non-aggression pact), the US and the Netherlands.[11]

Following the Nazi-Soviet pact, the clandestine station Radio Humanite was created by the Nazis to instigate French communists. This station claimed to be broadcasting from within France and at first promoted acts of sabotage against French military, “Use all your resources of intelligence and all your technical knowledge, prevent, delay, or make unusable what is manufactured for war”.[12]  There were many acts of sabotage by French Communists which were no doubt influenced by the idea that there is an already a large group of supporters for their cause.  Other black propaganda stations were set up with varying formats, the idea being an appeal to repetition in slightly different forms.  As the German army invaded France, these stations tried to create panic in the country by exaggerating the size and strength of the advancing army, appealing to fear and promising that surrender is the only way to survive against the invasion.  Voix de la paix (voice of the people) went so far as to claim great numbers of casualties and an imminent grisly fate for all French people.  These kinds of reports were always contradictory to the official French government line but it was difficult to distinguish legitimate French stations from the clandestine ones.[13]  The reasoning was that the more conflicting information people are exposed to, the more confusion there is and the more fear there is, leading to a much weaker resistance.

                                                British Clandestine stations

            British anti-Nazi clandestine stations began operating in 1940 with the “German Freedom station”, which overtly condemned the Nazis and made claims to German nationalism against Nazi oppression.  The decision to use black propaganda came after much debate as to what form it would take and was implemented only after Churchill became prime minister and directed the Special Operations Executive to “co-ordinate all action by way of subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas”.[14] This Station, claiming to originate from within Germany was joined by indigenous anti-Nazi stations despite the fact that stations actually broadcasting from within Germany were constantly being chased around the country by the Gestapo.[15]  After August 1941, a secret department (Political Warfare Executive) was created to handle exclusively black and white propaganda and it was under the direction of this office that the most significant broadcast operations were implemented.  The director of black radio broadcasts for Britain, Sefton Delmer, is attributed with massive advancements in the effectiveness of his operation principally because he used psychology to help the audience identify with the broadcasters.[16]

            The expansion of subversive propaganda was a result of the Nazi expansion of its borders and was effective because of the number and varying tones of subversive stations.  The number of “freedom stations” or Research Units as they were called internally grew rapidly in occupied countries as well as the number of general broadcasts to Germany.[17]  Prominent German exiles found jobs with the PWE, including many who were ex-Nazi officials.  The number of anti-Nazi stations increased, but the power of the broadcasts did not.  In order to reach such an extensive area as to include the growing war zones, many small stations had to be created and placed in strategic locations throughout Europe.  This was beneficial because each station would have its own sound and slightly different political views and so would be less suspect in the minds of the listeners.  The problem with these stations was the lack of power and thus broadcast range.  With the American entrance to the war, new and powerful technology was introduced and the clandestine operations received a boost.  This boost came in the form of a 600 kilowatt transmitter courtesy of RCA and a price gouging David Sarnoff.[18]  This transmitter, called the Aspidistra, was used to boost the power of black stations and the BBC, as well as override most jamming done by enemy transmitters.  It was also used after much debate in 1945 to make a fake broadcast regarding the advancement of allied troops on Germany.

            It is also important to note that while the existence of a Nazi fifth Column in Britain was not a significant faction capable of aiding the enemy in a substantial way.  There were, however, other more serious threats such as factions like the IRA which would have supported any enemy of the British crown.  Factions like these were aided financially and militarily by the Nazi regime and many broadcasts were targeting these groups.  For example, many broadcasts recounted atrocities against the Irish and made no mention of the war, making it believable that it was indeed an IRA station coming from within Great Britain.[19]

                                    United States Battlefront Operations

            Roosevelt gave a fireside chat in which he talks about how France was defeated so easily because of a fifth column operating within the country. [20] This gave significant power not only to the idea of a unified fifth column but also showed how effective the perceived use of propaganda was by the Nazis.  Later in the war, the US was even more concerned with the fifth column fear, in particular because the Nazi broadcasts “show also the value, in the Nazis estimation, of the political warfare upon which Britain and the United States are expending so much energy.”[21]  This statement, made in the New York Times, shows how serious Americans leaders considered propaganda on either side.

            Amidst these fifth column fears and following the defeat of France, an unofficial ambassador was sent to Britain to determine her wartime capabilities and what kind of assistance the United States could offer without entering the war formally.  “Colonel” William Donovan met with Churchill and the King, was educated about the resources Britain possessed, and was also educated about subversive warfare techniques being used by Special Operations (SO1, SO2, and PWE).  Reporting back to the cabinet, Donovan recommended, with outside support, the establishment of a super intelligence agency.  Among the supporting arguments for a new agency was that “the use of Radio as a weapon, though effectively used by Germany, is still to be perfected. But this perfection can only be realized by planning, and planning is dependant on accurate information.”[22]  Donovan was appointed the head of the new Office of Coordinator of Information (later called the OSS) and within this agency, the Foreign Information Service. The FIS was concerned with monitoring Axis broadcasts and countering with propaganda.  Taking a cue from Germany and Britain before him, Donovan set out to appeal to Germans fears of a fifth column.   The most well known subversive station was Radio 1212 which broadcast to Germany and started with accurate information with a pro-German bias.  The station would broadcast military defeats that Nazi officials had kept secret from their troops.   Particularly effective were the daily air raid reports because that kind of news was almost never available to the troops and they could also be broadcast before the air raids even happened.  This kind of radio could be called tactical grey propaganda because except for the nationality of the staff, no inaccurate information was broadcast until military commanders Eisenhower and Bradley started to direct the content on the station.  When the allies began the drive to the Rhineland, radio 1212 began to broadcast false information about the position of allied troops. [23]  This change no doubt had an effect on German troops who were by that time very fatigued and aware of how the war was progressing.

            When the US entered the war, transmitters were set up in Europe, Latin America and Asia and scripts were written in seventeen languages.  Because many of these broadcasts relied on domestic commercial companies, FIS also had to be concerned with making sure the broadcast adhered to a script produced by the FIS or was at least consistent with government agendas.  As FIS operations expanded, Donovan came into conflict with other officials who believed that there should be more information services while Donovan wanted international broadcasts to be used as instruments of war.[24] Among the ideas proposed for radio as an instrument of war was a pro-Nazi broadcast to the United States in order to try and discredit fifth column American Nazis. 

            One of the most notable and uses of Radio in war was the use of the Aspidistra transmitter during operation “Torch”-the allied invasion of North Africa under the command of Gen. Eisenhower.  This particular invasion was chosen because it was thought that the opposing troops would be mostly French and therefore pro-American.  Gen. Eisenhower saw radio as another weapon in his arsenal and incorporated its use into his overall plan for the invasion.  He created a committee of experienced covert radio personnel and insisted that they be under military command.  The commander of the new Physiological Warfare Service (PWS), Col. Charles Hazeltine had absolutely no experience in broadcasting or psychological warfare.  Disinformation was required to confuse the enemy as to where the invasion site would be and the defensive troops had to be convinced that cooperating with the allies would aid France.[25]

            During the invasion itself, a broadcast from FDR was given supporting the French who would not resist the Allies.  This broadcast was made in French and was carried on the BBC and the voice of America station.  Another address to the French by Gen. Eisenhower stated, “Our only objective is to defeat the enemy (Italian-German military forces in North Africa) and free France. I need not tell you we have no designs either on North Africa or any part of the French empire. We count on your friendship and ask for your aid”[26]  Other appeals were made to cooperate with the invasion from transmitters on battleships.  These broadcasts triggered the movement of the French anti-Vichy underground but did not significantly affect the defensive French troops.  This could be seen as a total failure of the radio aspect of the invasion considering that the allied forces met with strong resistance.  But since almost every other aspect of the invasion did not go as planned, it would seem that the broadcasts were ineffective because they unintentionally gave lots of false information, destroying their credibility.

                                               

The use of Radio propaganda during the Second World War is significant not only in influencing the outcome of the war but also because many modern techniques of broadcasting were perfected during this time.  Radio warfare is a battle like other military battles except it is for the minds and philosophies of people and not land or lives.  The battle also must rely on intelligence and research more than conventional warfare.  We can see the value of radio broadcast as an influencing medium at this time because of the enormous resources devoted to it by capable combatants.  The money and manpower of a nation during wartime are rationed and conserved and the fact that such a significant amount was spent of propaganda is a testament to the power of the mass media.  The techniques perfected during this time were used extensively during the cold war by the CIA against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact countries as well as in Latin America.  The main difference after the war was that the CIA and KGB, competing for spheres of influence, were the most active sponsors of black and white propaganda stations.

            The impact of propaganda operations starting when broadcasting was in its infancy influenced to a large extent the global media and the manner in which they operate today.  The Nazis proved the effectiveness of radio as a way to spread ideas and as the British and Americans responded in kind, it became increasingly apparent that this medium was the optimal way to reach a mass audience.  The impact of patriotic appeals on the home front was significant in uniting the country behind one cause and against another.  This impact was not lost on the broadcasters relaying the messages and the methods used to sell the war were then used to sell products.

 Advertisements, particularly campaign ads, are extremely similar to the home front propaganda during the war. There are always appeals to national unity while emphasizing the reasons why the opponent is bad and will cause all sorts of problems for America.  Marketing methods are virtually the same as the research needed before broadcasting to another country.  Many subversive stations began establishing credibility and creating an audience by finding out what the target audience liked to hear.  The types of music, entertainment, and even the accent of the broadcasters were considered very carefully before a program came on the air.  The difference is that now broadcasters compete for market share or advertising dollars and not political opinions for the most part.  This is certainly due in a large part to a present lack of direct influence from the government in the media.

The use of radio as a weapon was an important part of the mediums evolution and its power in such a capacity is still recognized today.  The most current example of this would be the role radio propaganda played in Rwanda.  In that case, some broadcasters were tried for war crimes because they used radio to incite people to murder.  The power of subversive radio is recognized today in the US as well, exemplified by the anti-terrorist legislation that drove most neo-Nazi Radio shows off the air.  Radio in an incredibly influential medium and this was recognized largely due to its role in what we sometimes call “the good war”.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

Bergmeier, Horst & Lotz, Rainer. Hitler’s Airwaves: the inside story of Nazi radio broadcasting. Yale University Press. London. 1997

Howe, Ellic. The Black Game: British subversive operations against the Germans during the Second World War. Michael Joseph Ltd.  London. 1982

Soley, Lawrence C. & Nichols. John S. Clandestine Radio Broadcasting: A study of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary electronic communication. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1987

Soley, Lawrence C. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1989

Stenton, Michael. Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe: British political warfare 1939-1943. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000

Cruickshank, Charles. The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938-1945. Davis-Poynter Ltd. London. 1977

O’Donoghue, David. Hitler’s Irish Voices: The story of German radio’s wartime Irish service. Beyond the Pale Publications. Dublin. 1998

Delfiner, Henry. Vienna Broadcasts to Slovakia: 1938-1939 a case study in subversion. Columbia University Press. New York. 1974

Martland, Peter. Lord Haw-Haw: the English voice of Nazi Germany. The Scarecrow Press Inc. Lanham, Maryland. 2003

Bannerman, R.L. Norman Corwin and Radio: the Golden Years. University of Alabama Press. Alabama. 1986

Joseph Goebbels, “Der Rundfunk als achte Großmacht,” Signale der neuen Zeit. 25 ausgewählte Reden von Dr. Joseph Goebbels (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1938), pp. 197-207. http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb56.htm

Marlin, Randel. Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuation. Broadview Press. Ontario, Canada. 2002

Radio propaganda and the art of understatement: British broadcasting and American neutrality, 1939-1941
Source: Historical journal of film, radio, and television [0143-9685] Cull yr:1993 vol:13 iss:4 pg:403 -432

BLACK PROPAGANDA BY RADIO: THE GERMAN CONCORDIA BROADCASTS TO BRITAIN 1940-1941  Doherty, Martin, Historical Journal of Film, Radio & Television, 0143-9685, June 1, 1994, Vol. 14, Issue 2
Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II.
Shull, Michael S.. Film & History, May2005, Vol. 35 Issue 1, p87-88, 2p; (AN 16468655

WAR ON THE AIR: Nazi Style. Mackey, David R.. Today’s Speech, April 1957, Vol. 5, p32-34, 3p; (AN CQ00147)

The BBC North American Service, 1939-1945.  P. Spence, Media, Culture and Society, vol 4, 1982, p.367-380

This is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America. Spiller, James. Journal of Radio Studies. Volume 11, No.1 2004

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


[1] Bergmeier, Horst & Lotz, Rainer. Hitler’s Airwaves: the inside story of Nazi radio broadcasting. Yale University Press. London. 1997. p.195

[2] The BBC North American Service, 1939-1945.  P. Spence, Media, Culture and Society, vol 4, 1982, p.367-380

[3] Radio propaganda and the art of understatement: British broadcasting and American neutrality, 1939-1941. Historical journal of film, radio, and television [0143-9685] Cull yr:1993 vol:13 iss:4 pg:403 -432

[4]Radio propaganda and the art of understatement: British broadcasting and American neutrality, 1939-1941. Historical journal of film, radio, and television [0143-9685] Cull yr:1993 vol:13 iss:4 pg:403 -432

[5] This is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America. Spiller, James. Journal of Radio Studies. Volume 11, No.1 2004

[6] Bannerman, R.L.  Norman Corwin and Radio: The Golden Years. University of Alabama Press. Alabama. 1986 p.89

[7] This is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America. Spiller, James. Journal of Radio Studies. Volume 11, No.1 2004

[8] This is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America. Spiller, James. Journal of Radio Studies. Volume 11, No.1 2004

[9] Joseph Goebbels, “Der Rundfunk als achte Großmacht,” Signale der neuen Zeit. 25 ausgewählte Reden von Dr. Joseph Goebbels (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1938), pp. 197-207.– http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb56.htm

[10] Marlin, Randel. Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuation. Broadview Press. Ontario, Canada. 2002. p.85

[11] Bergmeier, Horst & Lotz, Rainer. Hitler’s Airwaves: the inside story of Nazi radio broadcasting. Yale University Press. London. 1997. p.197

[12] Soley, Lawrence C. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1989.p.15

[13] Howe, Ellic. The Black Game: British subversive operations against the Germans during the Second World War. Michael Joseph Ltd.  London. 1982. p.62

[14] Cruickshank, Charles. The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938-1945. Davis-Poynter Ltd. London. 1977. p.17

[15] Soley, Lawrence C. & Nichols. John S. Clandestine Radio Broadcasting: A study of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary electronic communication. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1987. p.28

[16] Howe, Ellic. The Black Game: British subversive operations against the Germans during the Second World War. Michael Joseph Ltd.  London. 1982. p.19

[17] Howe, Ellic. The Black Game: British subversive operations against the Germans during the second world war. Michael Joseph Ltd.  London. 1982. p. 80

[18] Soley, Lawrence C. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1989. p.31

[19] O’Donoghue, David. Hitler’s Irish Voices: The story of German radio’s wartime Irish service. Beyond the Pale Publications. Dublin. 1998. p.60

[20] Soley, Lawrence C. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1989. p.47

[21] New York Times(1857-current file); December 20, 1942; ProQuest Historical Newspapers; The New York Times(1851-2002) p.39

[22] Soley, Lawrence C. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1989. p.56

[23] Soley, Lawrence C. & Nichols. John S. Clandestine Radio Broadcasting: A study of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary electronic communication. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1987. p.43

[24] Soley, Lawrence C. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1989. p.64

[25] Stenton, Michael. Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe: British political warfare 1939-1943. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000 p.211

[26] Soley, Lawrence C. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda. Praeger Publishers. New York. 1989. p.88